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Living with Global Imbalances
OVER THE YEARS, the Brookings Panel has focused overwhelmingly on
the U.S. economy. That emphasis reflected the principal interests of its
founders, Arthur Okun and George Perry. The United States is by far the
largest economy in the world, accounting for a quarter to a third of
global output, so understanding the U.S. economy is important. And this
economy is rich in data. But that still leaves over two-thirds of the world
economy. The Brookings Papers has made excursions into this area
from time to time. At various points Europe, Japan, and most recently
China have been addressed. There was a flurry of interest in the transi-
tion economies some years ago, in the international financial crises of
the mid- to late 1990s, and more rarely in developing countries more
broadly.
The U.S. economy and the economies of the rest of the world intersect
through international transactions. These have received more attention in
the Brookings Papers, although again largely with a U.S. focus. I will
address this intersection with respect to the large global imbalances that
exist today, although I will deviate from the usual practice here by adopt-
ing a rest-of-the-world rather than a U.S. perspective.
In this brief paper I want to cast doubt on two related propositions that
are widely accepted as truths: that Americans save too little, and that the
U.S. current account deﬁcit is unsustainably large, risking a disorderly
adjustment that would be damaging to the world economy in the rela-
tively near (but usually unspeciﬁed) future. These remarks should not be
treated as new truths, but as plausible alternative hypotheses about how
the world works these days, how we reached our current circumstances,
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I begin with U.S. saving because I will say less about it. The question
of whether Americans save enough relates to the broader topic of global
imbalances through the national accounts identity linking the current
account deﬁcit to the difference between domestic investment and national
saving. A current account deﬁcit cannot be reduced without reducing the
excess of investment over saving. Few argue that the United States should
invest less (except perhaps in housing during the housing boom, or in
routers and ﬁberoptic cable in the technology boom), which implies that if
the U.S. current account deﬁcit, around 6 percent of GDP in recent years,
is to be reduced, national saving—the sum of private and public saving—
must be increased. If, as some analysts suggest,
1 the current account deﬁcit
should not exceed 3 percent of GDP, and if investment is to be protected,
then saving must increase by 3 percent of GDP, or from 13 percent of GDP
to 16 percent in terms of 2006 shares. I will refer to gross saving and
investment throughout, as is appropriate in a world of rapid technological
change. “Replacement” investment is typically technologically superior to
its predecessor, and in any case a well-run firm will evaluate all large
investments afresh, moving depreciation allowances into new activities if
that is economically appropriate. Thus gross saving can be considered as
available for new allocation.
The U.S. current account deﬁcit has grown over the last decade or so,
from 1.5 percent of GDP in 1995 to 6.1 percent in 2005 and 2006.
2 Such
growth implies a widening gap between saving and investment. Invest-
ment rose in the late 1990s, as did government saving as the federal bud-
get moved into surplus; meanwhile private saving declined. In the early
2000s investment declined, but public saving declined even more, by an
extraordinary 6 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2004, as a result of
recession, federal tax cuts in 2001 and 2003, and increased expenditure
for the military, for homeland security, and under other headings. Private
saving recovered somewhat with the growth in corporate earnings from
2001 to 2005, despite a continued decline in recorded household saving.
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1. See, for example, Cline (2005).
2. U.S. current account and international investment position data are from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis international accounts.
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in other rich countries and in some poor countries for many years. That
the U.S. economy continues to grow robustly is testimony to the relative
efficiency with which Americans use capital—or perhaps in part to the
inappropriate conventions economists use to measure investment and
saving.
Saving and investment in the national accounts, which were designed
over sixty years ago at the height of the industrial age, are deﬁned largely
in terms of structures and equipment (although computer software was
recently added). This is hardly appropriate for a so-called knowledge
economy. Economists conceive of saving as consumption that is deferred
today for the sake of greater consumption at some time in the future, per-
haps by oneself, perhaps by future generations. On this deﬁnition, several
items should be added to “saving” as currently recorded in the national
accounts. Among the obvious ones are educational expenditure, expendi-
ture on research and development, and purchases of consumer durables.
Another item, not ofﬁcially included in GDP, is intangible investment by
businesses in training and in company and product branding.
3 Adding
these items to saving and investment for 2005 raises those quantities
from 14 and 20 percent of GDP, respectively, as defined in the national
accounts, to 39 and 44 percent (after also augmenting GDP by 15 percent to
allow for the addition of intangible investment). These ﬁgures do not sug-
gest that Americans are shorting the future, particularly when allowance is
made for the high returns to education and to research and development.
Recent poll results notwithstanding, it is extremely improbable that future
Americans will be worse off than the current generation in material terms.
So far as I can tell, the pipeline of prospective innovations is full; it would
take a severe catastrophe for these, and the associated investment, not to
mature into higher income per capita, as they have steadily done during
the past half century. This generation’s biggest legacy to the next is a suc-
cessful apparatus—both institutions and incentives—for technical change
and innovation.
From the perspective of the household, allowance should also be made
for capital gains on real and ﬁnancial assets, which can increasingly be
mobilized for reinvestment thanks to innovations in ﬁnancial markets such
Richard N. Cooper 93
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Unlike new investment, these do not add to social returns in the future
(although some part of capital gains on equities may reﬂect the intangible
investments made by corporations), but they legitimately count as “sav-
ing” from a household’s perspective. And they make a huge difference for
total household wealth. Household net worth rose by 6.5 percent a year
over 1990–2005, and by 8 percent in 2005 alone—a year when negative
personal rates of saving as recorded in the national accounts grabbed the
ﬁnancial headlines. Of course, these are aggregate ﬁgures; they do not
address the distribution of saving across households. Doubtless many fam-
ilies would be well advised to save more in their own interest.
The revised calculations of saving and investment above do not affect
the discrepancy between the two, since saving and investment are raised
by the same amount. I draw attention to them to suggest, rather, that it
will be difficult if not impossible to raise U.S. national saving further,
except through the federal budget. Private saving may rise of its own
accord if house prices decline or stabilize for any length of time; but
households are not likely to be quick to acknowledge the need to reduce
their consumption.
What does all this mean for today’s global imbalances? Can a U.S. cur-
rent account deﬁcit in excess of $800 billion a year be sustained? The
answer from a technical economic point of view (as distinguished from
psychological or political perspectives, which I do not address here) is an
unambiguous yes. Some argue that the deﬁcit is large beyond all prece-
dent in this country, veering into the “danger range” at which some devel-
oping countries have run into payments crises in the past. Some argue that
the deﬁcit cannot be sustained because at some point foreigners will cease
to be willing to invest enough in the United States, or because the United
States will run out of assets attractive to foreigners, or both. Some con-
cede that the deﬁcit might be sustainable at its current level, but maintain
that it is on a trend that cannot be sustained. Some judge the deﬁcit to be
undesirable even if sustainable, not least on grounds that it permits higher
current consumption but bequeaths greater liabilities to future generations.
Whether it is desirable or not depends, of course, on the feasible alterna-
tives, not on abstract considerations.
I will try to address quantitatively two questions: whether foreign sav-
ing will be adequate to ﬁnance a continuing or even a rising U.S. current
account deﬁcit, and whether U.S. ﬁnancial claims of adequate quality will
94 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
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address foreigners’ motivation to invest in the United States.
The U.S. current account deficit (which by definition equals net for-
eign investment in the United States, apart from measurement errors) of
$811 billion in 2006 was certainly unprecedentedly large. But in fact it
was smaller than the deﬁcit that would have resulted if world ﬁnancial
markets were fully globalized, if globalization is taken to mean that savers
around the world allocate their saving according to the relative sizes of
national economies, without any bias toward domestic investments. Such a
“gravity model” approach to world ﬁnancial ﬂows, of course, involves a
vast simpliﬁcation, but it is an informative starting point.
The results of such a calculation are shown in table 1. The U.S. share
of the world economy (at market exchange rates, the relevant measure for
this calculation) was 30 percent in 2000, rose slightly in 2001–02, and
then declined to 27.5 percent in 2006. With no home bias, the rest of the
world would have invested these shares of its saving in the United States.
Americans, by the same token, in 2000 would have invested 70 percent of
their saving in the rest of the world, rising to 72.5 percent in 2006. Apply-
ing these percentages to actual saving (from the International Monetary
Fund’s World Economic Outlook) in the rest of the world and the United
States, respectively, would have resulted in net foreign investment of
$480 billion in the United States in 2000, compared with an actual 
flow of $380 billion. Net foreign investment in this simple model would 
have risen to $1.2 trillion in 2006, compared with actual investment of
$811 billion. So foreign investment in the United States can be expected
to rise over time until the slow decline in the U.S. share fully offsets the
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Table 1. Hypothetical Investment Flows in a Fully Globalized World
Trillions of dollars
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Actual world saving
(exc. United States) 5.02 5.23 6.21 7.44 8.27 9.16
Foreign investment in
United States
a 1.61 1.67 1.84 2.10 2.31 2.52
U.S. investment abroad
b 1.13 1.01 1.02 1.11 1.16 1.32
Net inward foreign investment 0.48 0.66 0.82 0.99 1.15 1.20
Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF, World Economic Outlook (April 2007), tables 1 and 43, and World Bank, World
Economic Indicators.
a. Assumes that the share of non-U.S. saving invested in the United States would equal the share of the United States in
world GDP.
b. Assumes that the share of U.S. saving invested abroad would equal the share of the rest of the world in world GDP.
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overcome the annual increases in foreign saving, or until foreign saving
falls sufﬁciently to close the gap.
This calculation takes gross saving as given, and it ignores the impact
that actual investment opportunities, through such characteristics as their
yield, risk, and liquidity, might have on decisions about how to allocate
saving. In this respect it is similar to the gravity models of trade, which
focus on economic size and distance and ignore the structure of compara-
tive costs, which are what give rise to the incentives to trade. I now turn to
incentives.
Demography and the Saving-Investment Balance
The net current account surplus of the rest of the world must by defi-
nition equal the U.S. current account deficit, apart from measurement
errors. This surplus implies an excess in the rest of the world of national
saving over domestic investment. Why do such surpluses occur, espe-
cially given that many countries run budget deficits, which absorb much
of the excess private saving? Part of the answer is that a significant rise
in oil prices since 2002 increased government revenue in the oil-exporting
countries in the first instance, producing budget surpluses. Much of this
saving will be transitory as this revenue enters the domestic income
stream, raising private incomes and import demand. However, a number
of oil-exporting countries have now emulated Kuwait and Norway in
setting aside a portion of their large oil earnings, investing them abroad
for the benefit of future generations. Thus significant saving in these
countries may endure for many years.
There are many other reasons for high saving, related, among other
things, to uncertainty and even insecurity about the future (partly due
to memories of past adversity), imperfect arrangements for consumer
credit for large purchases, corporate management incentives to retain
rather than distribute earnings, and so on. But one factor has received
too little attention, and indeed what little notice it has gotten has been
misleading. That is the dramatic demographic transformation that many
countries are going through. Much has been written about the aging of
societies, with appropriate focus on unfunded pension and medical care
commitments by governments. But aging is occurring for two quite dif-
96 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
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natality.
Longevity in the United States rose by 8.2 years over the past half cen-
tury, and in Japan it rose by about twice that. When such increases are not
accompanied by a corresponding increase in the average retirement age,
one can expect to see households increase not only their saving for retire-
ment, but also their precautionary saving, since lives are not only longer
but also uncertain in their length. The standard model of life-cycle saving
behavior, in which dissaving occurs in one’s later years, typically assumes
a known, or known expected, time of death. In reality, there is much uncer-
tainty and, thanks to steadily advancing medical technology, perhaps even
increasing uncertainty about the time of death. All else equal, this should
increase saving, even into retirement, especially in a context of growing
uncertainty about the ﬁnancial viability of many public pension schemes.
Americans have heard much about the future problems of their social
security system, but public pension schemes in many other countries are
in even worse shape.
These effects of increasing longevity are important, but the aging of
societies through reduced natality has perhaps an even greater influence
on national saving-investment balances, by reducing investment. Low
natality implies, over time, declining numbers of young adults, hence
fewer new households, hence lower demand for schools, housing, and
all the appurtenances associated with housing, such as appliances and
furniture. Reduced natality also means less new capital will be required
to equip new members of the labor force with the average share of the
productive capital stock. In addition, young adults today are on average
the most highly educated and most flexible members of the labor force,
geographically and occupationally. A decline in their numbers will thus
have a negative impact, ceteris paribus, on productivity growth in an era
of continuous advances in technology and changes in the composition of
demand. Of course, some capital deepening will occur, but that will drive
down the domestic return to capital.
Saving rates have dropped in Japan, although less than life-cycle devo-
tees expected. But investment has dropped even more. Private saving
in Germany has risen, mostly absorbed by a 4-percentage-point increase
in the public deficit between 2000 and 2005, but investment has fallen
sharply. A roughly similar pattern has occurred in the newly rich Asian
economies. In contrast, investment rose in developing Asia, exceeding
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rapidly growing economies.
Population projections in these countries and others are striking. Most
rich countries, along with China, now have a net reproduction ratio below
unity; that is, populations are not reproducing themselves. The average
number of children per woman of childbearing age is around 1.4 in Ger-
many and Japan, and 1.0 in Hong Kong and Singapore (2.1 children per
woman are required to sustain a population in the long run). The popula-
tions of Germany and Japan have already peaked, despite increasing
longevity, and the number of young adults has been declining for some
time, and this will continue.
Among the rich countries, the United States stands out as a strong
exception: although birthrates have declined, they remain above 2 per
woman, and the U.S. population is being augmented by over a million
immigrants a year, who in general are young and over time become well
integrated into the U.S. labor force. Table 2 presents U.S. Census Bureau
projections of the number of young adults (ages 15–29) in each of the
world’s largest economies plus four newly rich Asian economies, whose
current account surpluses together (when Germany is augmented by its
two close economic neighbors, the Netherlands and Switzerland) in 2006
equaled 90 percent of the U.S. deficit. (The surpluses of oil exporters
equaled an additional 46 percent of the U.S. deficit. The U.S. deficit in
turn equaled 70 percent of total world deficits.) The numbers of young
adults declined in absolute terms in China, Germany, Japan, and the four
newly rich economies, at a rate of roughly 1 percent a year. The number
of young adults in these countries also declined steeply as a share of total
population. In the United States, in contrast, the number of young adults is
expected to rise slowly over the next two decades, and the actual increase
will probably be even greater because of the Census Bureau’s conservative
assumptions regarding immigration.
China, of course, is in different circumstances from Germany, Japan,
and  other rich countries. Its rural population, despite having fallen by
20 percentage points of total population over the past two decades, remains
large, and therefore much further rural-to-urban migration can be expected.
The rapid growth of the urban labor force can be expected to continue, and
with it demand for housing, schools, and productive capital stock. More-
over, Chinese incomes have grown rapidly, and this growth can be expected
to continue and result in a housing boom, as people not only change loca-
98 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
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investment rates are high. But with income per capita growing at over 7 per-
cent a year, in the presence of desires for lumpy expenditures and an under-
developed capital market, Chinese saving rates have increased even as
consumption has grown rapidly. Moreover, many Chinese state-owned
enterprises have been modernized and downsized, improving their earn-
ings, while others enjoy quasi-monopoly proﬁts. State enterprises in China
do not have to pay dividends to their government owners, and therefore as
earnings have increased, so have recorded corporate savings.
Why Invest in the United States?
Given that a number of the largest and richest countries, as well as
some poor countries such as China, have excess saving, why does so
much of that saving go to the United States rather than to other countries?
After all, under simple neoclassical assumptions, excess national saving
should ﬂow to those regions of the world where the return to capital is
highest, which are assumed to be those where capital is scarce relative to
other factors of production, most notably labor but including also arable
land and speciﬁc natural resources.
Part of the answer is that this widely accepted proposition is a vast
generalization, and discerning investors do not invest on the basis of such
generalizations, even if economists are comfortable with or, indeed,
seem to prefer them. Details are all-important. Security of investment is
important, often trumping high yields for many investors, especially those
investing for retirement. Recent experience in Argentina, Bolivia, Russia,
Richard N. Cooper 99
Table 2. Population Aged Fifteen to Twenty-Nine in Selected Economies, 
2005 and 2025
Millions
Country or group 2005 2025 Change, 2005–25 (percent)
China 321 259 −19
Japan 22.6 17.8 −21
Germany 14.2 11.9 −16
Newly rich Asian economies
a 18.6 14.2 −24
United States 61.9 66.0 7
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
a. Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.
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by foreigners, is not always secure. Also, in the capital-poorest countries,
yields are often low because of strong complementarities between invested
private capital and the institutional setting, the latter interpreted broadly
as including but not limited to public infrastructure.
Despite these shortcomings, much private foreign capital has gone
into developing countries in recent years: over $500 billion (net) in 2005,
mostly to East Asia and Central Europe.
4 But this compares with over
$1 trillion in foreign private funds invested in the United States in 2005,
and nearly $1.5 trillion in 2006.
There are several reasons why foreigners might prefer the already
capital-rich United States as a locus for investment. One is simply the size
of the economy, noted above. Another is that property rights are secure in
the United States, and dispute settlement is relatively speedy and impartial.
A third is that the United States continues to be a dynamic economy, despite
its wealth and maturity, partly because of the demographic features noted
above, but also because it is highly innovative and relatively more ﬂexible
than other mature economies (and even than many immature ones).
U.S. ﬁnancial markets are even larger relative to the rest of the world
than is its GDP, accounting for over 40 percent of the world’s securities
(stocks and bonds). In fact, the U.S. share of the world’s marketable secu-
rities is probably more than half if allowance is made for the fact that
many shares of companies in other countries are unavailable for invest-
ment, often because they are in government hands. Because of its size and
institutional arrangements, many marketable securities are much more
liquid in the U.S. market than is true in other ﬁnancial markets, increasing
their attractiveness to passive investors. The U.S. market also offers a
wide array of ﬁnancial assets of differing risk characteristics.
Finally, yields on U.S. debt instruments have recently been higher than
those on similar instruments in many other rich countries, notably Japan
and continental Europe. Yields have been still higher in Britain and
Australia, which share some of the other characteristics of the United
States. It is perhaps not a coincidence that net foreign investment has
also been high in those countries in recent years.
Foreign portfolio investment in the United States is overwhelmingly
denominated in U.S. dollars; indeed, it simply represents purchases of
100 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
4. World Bank, Global Development Finance 2007.
10922-07a_Cooper_rev.qxd  1/25/08  11:14 AM  Page 100U.S. domestic instruments by people or institutions who happen to reside
abroad. Most of these investors therefore bear exchange rate risk. Does
this risk not overwhelm the favorable yield differential? Apparently not.
One possible reason is that foreign investors are not conscious of the
exchange rate risk they are running. But this seems extremely unlikely,
given that most of the investors are sophisticated ﬁnancial institutions,
and that economists have been unsparing in pointing out the risks, which
have thus had more than adequate publicity.
It must be that foreign investors ﬁnd the characteristics of their U.S.
investments sufﬁciently attractive to overcome the exchange risks. They
may also discount the risk, perhaps because they see little reason to expect
movements in exchange rates large enough to negate the yield differential.
They may take this view either because they implicitly accept the struc-
tural reasons developed above for believing the large U.S. current account
deﬁcits to be sustainable, or for some other reason. For example, they may
believe that any large exchange rate movement would be sufficiently
damaging to elicit countervailing action by the monetary authorities in
the affected countries. Of course, after the fact they may be shown to
have been wrong in all of these possibilities.
Much has been made of the fact that some of the ﬁnancing of the U.S.
current account deﬁcit has come from central bank purchases of dollar-
denominated assets. Is this evidence that something other than the attrac-
tiveness of U.S. yields is driving these ﬂows? Not necessarily. Arguably,
in some of these cases, central banks are simply acting as ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries on behalf of their aging publics, who either choose not to or are
not permitted to invest directly abroad. In any case the inﬂow of funds to
the United States remains overwhelmingly private in origin (if not always
in beneﬁcial ownership): private ﬂows were over three-fourths of the
totals in 2005 and 2006.
How Long Can the United States Provide Assets for Purchase?
What about the outlook for investment opportunities in the United
States? Will foreigners soon acquire so many U.S. assets that their avail-
ability will be exhausted? Not anytime soon. It is useful ﬁrst to examine
some simple debt dynamics and then look at the relationship of U.S.
external indebtedness to the availability of U.S. assets.
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international investment position (NIIP). Let D represent NIIP, Y output
(GDP), r the net return on D, and B the deficit in trade in goods and
services (excluding investment income) plus unilateral transfers. Then
dD = B + rD. Stabilizing D relative to GDP (D/Y) implies that dD/D
equals growth in nominal GDP. If growth in nominal U.S. GDP in the
coming years is assumed to be 5 percent, then a stable D/Y would
require that B/D + r = 0.05.
At the end of 2006, the NIIP of the United States was $2.2 trillion, or 
16 percent of U.S. GDP.
5 The current account deficit, as mentioned
before, was around 6 percent. These numbers suggest little prospect of
stabilizing D/Y anytime soon, if ever, even if interest payments to for-
eigners are low. It looks as though the U.S. deﬁcit may not be sustainable,
or that it can be sustained only if r is negative.
In fact, to date r has been negative, since recorded earnings on U.S.
investments abroad have continued to exceed foreign earnings on invest-
ments in the United States despite a negative NIIP since the late 1980s.
Moreover, total returns on foreign investments substantially exceed
recorded earnings, and the gap favoring the United States has been even
larger, thanks mainly to increases in market values and, to a much lesser
extent, depreciation of the dollar. Thus, although the cumulative U.S.
current account deficit over 1990–2006 was $5.21 trillion, the increase 
in the net debtor position of the United States, at $2 trillion, was less 
than half that. The average annual total return on U.S. investments
abroad since 1990 (including exchange rate effects, discussed below)
was 10.0 percent, compared with a total return of 6.2 percent on foreign
investments in the United States. The main reason is that equity invest-
ment, both direct investment and portfolio equity, makes up a substan-
tially larger share of U.S. claims on the rest of the world (61 percent)
than of foreign investments in the United States (35 percent). Americans
act in effect as risk-taking intermediaries in the world economy, selling
fixed-interest claims and investing in equity; they thus earn an equity
premium in the world economy.
In addition, changes in exchange rates affect valuations when U.S. claims
on foreign assets are converted into dollars, in which the U.S. NIIP is reck-
102 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2007
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most foreign claims on the United States are denominated in dollars. When
the dollar depreciates against other currencies, U.S. claims rise in value
relative to foreign claims, and vice versa when the dollar appreciates.
These combined valuation effects can be substantial. In 2005 the U.S.
current account deﬁcit was $755 billion, but the NIIP actually increased
by $200 billion. (Reversals in sign also occurred in 1999 and 2003.) The
deﬁcit of $811 billion in 2006 produced no change in the NIIP, on prelim-
inary ﬁgures. Remarkably, the ratio of the NIIP to GDP declined from
over 23 percent in 2001 to less than 17 percent in 2006, despite large and
growing U.S. current account deﬁcits during this period. Indeed, D/Y was
only 4 percentage points of GDP higher in 2006 than eight years earlier,
despite a cumulative current account deﬁcit of 38 percentage points of
GDP. The dollar depreciated on balance over this period, and the NIIP
would have equaled 19 percent of GDP at the end of 2006, or 2.6 percent-
age points higher than it was, if the dollar had not depreciated. Most of the
valuation changes, in other words, were not due to exchange rate changes.
The ratio of the U.S. NIIP to GDP is far below where it would be in a
world without home bias, as described above, where foreigners would
hold nearly 30 percent of their assets in the United States (over twice the
ratio they currently hold). On these grounds, then, the NIIP could still rise
signiﬁcantly.
How much of the United States do foreigners own? Here it is necessary
to look at gross foreign investment in the United States, before netting it
against American investment abroad. Total foreign claims on the United
States at end-2005 were $11.1 trillion (including only the net position of
U.S. banks), equal to 89 percent of GDP during that year and roughly the
same percentage of the private nonresidential ﬁxed capital stock. Total
foreign claims then grew to $13.6 trillion by the end of 2006, much faster
than GDP. The share of foreign ownership has increased steadily for the
past two decades. But foreigners do not generally invest in the domestic
capital stock, and their share of ownership of U.S. assets is not rising
nearly as rapidly as one might suppose based on the dollar values alone. A
remarkable feature of the U.S. economy is that the total value of ﬁnancial
assets has risen signiﬁcantly more rapidly than the underlying economy.
The Federal Reserve estimates total ﬁnancial assets in the U.S. economy
at the end of 2006 to have been $129 trillion (this ﬁgure is of course sen-
sitive to the system of classiﬁcation used in the ﬂow of funds accounts,
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lier, in 1965, total ﬁnancial assets were only 4.8 times GDP. Put another
way, while nominal GDP grew by 7.4 percent a year over 1965–2006, total
ﬁnancial assets grew by 9.2 percent a year.
This phenomenon reﬂects, among other things, innovation by the ﬁnan-
cial sector, which has devised a host of new financial instruments to
appeal to a wider variety of circumstances and tastes. This articulation of
ﬁnancial assets appeals to many foreigners as well as to Americans, and
foreigners invest in a wide array of these instruments. So although the
stock of gross foreign investment in the United States exceeded GDP in
magnitude in 2006, it amounted to only 12 percent of total ﬁnancial assets
in the United States. The share has risen from 3 percent in the mid-1980s,
but the rise has been slow.
Total ﬁnancial assets include claims by one sector on another. Ulti-
mately, the U.S. economy is “owned” by households in the United States,
plus nonproﬁt organizations (churches, foundations, universities, etc.),
plus foreigners. The foreign share of ﬁnancial assets owned by these par-
ties (after netting out intersectoral claims) grew from 7 percent in 1980 to
14 percent in 2000 to 15 percent in 2006. This ownership represents claims
on future output of the U.S. economy. It remains well below the level of
foreign ownership that would obtain in a “no home bias” world. It also
remains below levels of foreign ownership (relative to GDP) that have
been reached in many other countries, including Australia, Britain, France,
Germany, Italy, and Spain. So although the foreign-owned share of U.S.
ﬁnancial assets cannot grow without limit, it can grow for many years
before it begins to strain the American capacity to provide ﬁnancial assets.
Should We Worry about the U.S. Current Account Deﬁcit?
Viewed in the context of globalization and demographic change in other
rich countries, the large U.S. current account deﬁcit is both comprehensi-
ble and welfare-enhancing from a global point of view, reflecting
intertemporal trade, so long as Americans invest the funds productively.
Prospective retirees around the world are making investments in the United
States that are profitable and secure. If this is so, strong governmental
efforts to reduce the current account deﬁcit might be deeply misguided at
best, and run a serious risk of precipitating the financial crisis or eco-
nomic recession that proponents of such action hope to forestall.
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States should be running a current account surplus, not a deficit. More
recently it has been suggested that, to achieve sustainability, the deficit
needs to be reduced to no more than around 3 percent of GDP from the
current 6 percent. Reduction of the deficit by 3 percent of GDP would
require that U.S. expenditure also drop, relative to output, by 3 percent
of U.S. GDP, or roughly 1 percent of GDP in the rest of the world. For-
eign surpluses, taken together, would have to decline by 3 percent of
U.S. GDP, implying a rise in demand relative to output by that amount
elsewhere in the world.
It is also usually said that, to bring about the required substitutions in
product demand, the dollar must depreciate, and probably signiﬁcantly—
perhaps by 30 percent on a trade-weighted basis. So the additional demand
in the rest of the world must be domestic demand. For export-oriented
economies such as Japan, Germany, and China, currency appreciation is
likely to discourage, not encourage, productive investment. So the addi-
tional demand must come from domestic consumers or governments. But
many governments have been concerned about excessive budget deﬁcits
in recent years and are engaged in ﬁscal consolidation. This is especially
true for Japan and Germany, two countries with large current account
surpluses. That leaves consumers. What will induce aging consumers out-
side the United States to spend more? Easier monetary policy, which in
Euroland is outside the control of national governments, would in a world
of high capital mobility tend to weaken currencies, not strengthen them.
The prescription must therefore combine stimulative fiscal policy with
tighter monetary policy and currency appreciation. Yet Europe’s mid-term
policy focus, reﬂected in the Lisbon agenda of 2000, has on the contrary
been on fiscal consolidation plus measures to improve productivity and
output, resulting (as explicitly desired) in greater international competi-
tiveness, not greater domestic demand.
China, which controls its exchange rate, could decide to revalue sub-
stantially, as many have urged. But even if China were to eliminate its
current account surplus entirely, only a fraction of the resulting reduction
in global imbalances would accrue to the United States, as U.S. imports
from China would largely switch to other low-income countries. That
would still leave a U.S. current account deﬁcit in excess of the targeted
level. Moreover, what would an appreciation large enough to eliminate
China’s surplus do to China’s economy, where exports of manufactures
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not been China’s only source of growth in demand. Public and private con-
struction has boomed, and Chinese consumption grew in excess of 8 per-
cent a year during 1989–2005, faster than anywhere else in the world. But
exports have been the driving sector.
The argument developed here suggests that the U.S. current account
deﬁcit can continue for some years and even widen. Of course, a signiﬁ-
cant depreciation of the dollar might nevertheless occur. Financial mar-
kets are driven by psychological as well as by economic factors. If enough
people decide to sell dollars, the dollar will depreciate. Or if foreigners
collectively decide to invest less in the United States than the current
account deﬁcit (plus American capital outﬂow), the dollar will depreciate.
A large drop in the dollar would have grave economic consequences,
reducing exports and depressing investment in other rich countries. For
this reason, their monetary authorities are likely at some point to intervene
in foreign exchange markets to limit the resulting downturn, in effect sub-
stituting official for private capital investment in the United States and
thereby putting effective limits to any depreciation of the dollar.
But, of course, the current account deﬁcit cannot rise indeﬁnitely relative
to GDP, nor can foreign-owned assets rise indeﬁnitely as a share of total
U.S. assets. Sooner or later the process of ﬁnancial globalization will slow
and eventually stop, probably well before the hypothetical state of “no
home bias” is reached. Moreover, aging societies will eventually reach the
point at which they cease acquiring new foreign assets and begin to liqui-
date their outstanding claims. Then the U.S. deﬁcit must decline, perhaps
signiﬁcantly. The trade deﬁcit will need to decline even earlier, as foreign-
ers begin to consume the earnings on their U.S. investments. But that point
may not be reached for a decade or longer, especially if people work longer
and continue to save past the conventional retirement age, as many do.
As Asians and Europeans begin to consume their overseas earnings and
the underlying assets, total expenditure in their countries will rise relative
to output, and their current account surpluses will decline and eventually
disappear. This process alone will help reduce the U.S. deﬁcit, without any
depreciation of the dollar against their currencies. To what extent the dol-
lar needs to depreciate will depend on the emerging consumption patterns
in the aging societies, and in particular on the mix between tradable and
nontradable goods and services, keeping in mind that these categories are
themselves constantly changing, as increased possibilities for offshoring
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enter the international accounts insofar as they are provided by temporary
migrant workers who remit earnings to their home countries. Elder care is
likely to involve both processes, with diagnoses performed in remote loca-
tions and treatment provided by migrant workers in situ, as the children
and grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the aged choose to stay in
the labor force.
Another possibility involves Asians and Europeans retiring in the
United States, just as some Canadians do now. Their assets would then
cease to be foreign claims on the United States.
The adjustment process involves the classic transfer problem in a more
complex setting. How much, if at all, the dollar needs eventually to depre-
ciate will depend on all of these factors, and certainly cannot be foretold
years in advance of the required adjustment.
The United States has a vibrant, innovative economy. Its demograph-
ics differ markedly from those of other rich countries, in that birthrates
have not fallen nearly so far and immigration, concentrated among young
adults, can be expected to continue on a signiﬁcant scale. In these respects
the United States, although rich and politically mature, can be said to be a
young and even a developing country. It has an especially innovative
financial sector, which continually introduces new products to cater to
diverse portfolio tastes. The United States has a comparative advantage, in
a globalized market, in producing marketable securities and in exchang-
ing low-risk debt for higher risk equity. It is not surprising that savers
around the world want to put a growing portion of their savings into the
U.S. economy. The U.S. current account deficit and the corresponding
surpluses elsewhere, although conventionally described as imbalances,
do not necessarily signal economic disequilibria in a globalized world
economy, and they may well remain large for years to come.
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General Discussion
William Nordhaus agreed with Richard Cooper that saving is understated in
the national accounts, but he noted some improvements in this area, such as
the addition of software spending to investment and output in the core
accounts, the creation of a satellite account for research and development,
and ongoing work to create a satellite account for education. Nordhaus
wondered why Cooper used gross rather than net saving and investment. For
most countries net investment is much smaller than gross, and the current
account is a net saving concept. Cooper replied that gross saving and invest-
ment are the relevant concepts because ﬁrms do not distinguish between
depreciation allowances and other sources of internal funding, but instead
treat all investments in the same manner based on an assessment of their
proﬁtability.
Charles Schultze suggested that the magnitude of Cooper’s adjustments
to saving and investment was overstated. For example, including advertis-
ing makes some sense because it provides information to consumers, but
it also creates negative externalities for other ﬁrms, as one ﬁrm’s gain is
another firm’s loss. Similarly, recent large increases in aggregate public
spending for elementary and secondary education have not had a large
payoff. From 1974 to 2004, real per pupil spending for public K–12
education doubled, but the performance of seventeen-year-olds on national
assessment tests in math and reading was more or less flat. Competition
regulates rates of return on private investment, but the same is not true for
public education. Schultze added that the same problems apply to many
other government investments, such as highways and ﬂood control infra-
structure. Because no method exists for properly determining the scale and
allocation of these investments, the relationship between the money spent
and the return is complicated.
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William Gale added that including additional forms of saving raises the
estimated level of saving but does not reverse its decline over time. Gale
also wondered how much the analysis of the U.S. current account deﬁcit
changes if Americans’ foreign borrowing is mostly done for consumption
rather than for investment. Similarly, he wondered how the analysis changes
if investment from abroad is composed more of foreign central banks buying
Treasury bonds than of foreign private investors buying real assets. Cooper
replied that inﬂows to the United States are overwhelmingly private. In fact,
he noted, even ofﬁcial ﬂows are often mediated private ﬂows: In Japan, for
example, where large quantities of domestic savings are conservatively held
in domestic banks, the central bank invests some of these assets in foreign
markets in order to meet the country’s retirement needs.
Olivier Blanchard suggested that uncertainties about the factors support-
ing the current capital inflow to the United States tilt heavily toward a
reduction in that inﬂow in the future: foreign ofﬁcial purchases seem more
likely to decline than to increase, the institutional setting for investments in
other countries is likely to improve, recent declines in the value of the dollar
are likely to heighten perceptions of exchange rate risk, and America’s role
as a risk-taking ﬁnancial intermediary in the world economy may backﬁre.
Martin Feldstein pointed out that the real foreign exchange value of the
dollar has dropped about 15 to 20 percent over the last ﬁve years, depending
on the measure used. Therefore the current account deﬁcit should decline
further, and he wondered about the implications for Europe and other
countries. To avoid recession in their countries, he suggested, foreigners
will have to increase their consumption by 2 or 3 percent of their GDP,
which may be possible given their current high saving rates.
Robert Gordon emphasized that differences in asset returns and changes
in the value of the dollar have prevented an explosion of U.S. net international
indebtedness so far: U.S. net debt to foreigners was the same fraction of
GDP in 2006 as it had been in 2001 (19 percent), despite a cumulative current
account deﬁcit of 30 percentage points of GDP over this period. Robert
Lawrence pointed out that receipts on U.S. assets abroad exceed payments
on foreign assets in the United States by about 1⁄4 percent of GDP, the same
as twenty years ago. Given that the burden has not increased—partly because
of the different mix of investments here than abroad—it is difﬁcult to
argue that the current position is unsustainable. Lawrence added that the
demographic factors described in the paper were interesting, but the same
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basically balanced, so there must be more to the story.
Cooper emphasized that he did not consider the current imbalance a
“steady state,” nor did he expect it to last forever. Still, he did expect
imbalances to persist for a decade or more. Eventually, retirement in
Japan and Germany will exhaust savings in these countries, and current
account positions will change.
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